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ABSTRACIT observe the outcomes of some engagements before makingfurther assignments). This is sometimes called a shoot-look-
In this paper we present a progress report on our work on shoot strategy in the literature. In this paper we will provide
the dynamic version of the Weapon to Target Assignment some results on simple cases of the dynamic problem and
(WTA) problem and on the static version of the WTA problem make comparisons with the corresponding static problem.
in which vulnerable C3 nodes are included in the formulation. The above resource allocation problem will typically be
In the static WTA problem, weapons must be assigned to solved at a C3 node and the results transmitted to the relevant
targets with the objective of minimizing the total expected
number (or value) of the surviving targets. In the dynamic resources. These C3 nodes will therefore be of vital
version, this allocation is done in time stages so that the importance to the defense since their destruction will in effect
outcomes of previous engagements can be used in making paralyze the resources over which they have control. One
future assignments. We will show that, for the simple cases approach, that can be used to increase the reliability of the
studied, there is a significant cost advantage in using the system, is to replicate the C3 nodes. In this way destruction of
dynamic strategy. We believe that similar results will hold for the primary C3 node does not affect the defense's system since
the more general problem. its function can then be performed by one of the "backup" C3
In the static defense-asset problem with vulnerable C3 nodes. We have formulated a model which includes these
nodes the offense is allowed to either attack the assets replicated nodes and will provide results on simple cases of the
themselves or to first attack the command and control system, problem.
and then the assets; if the C3 nodes are destroyed then the
defensive interceptors are assumed unusable. We first consider This paper is in effect a progress report of our work on
simple cases where assumptions are made as to offensive and the resource allocation problem and on the survivability issue
defensive states of knowledge and kill probabilities. Strategies mentioned in the previous paragraph. The models being used
are then developed and optimal weapon allocations identified. are rich enough to capture the nature of the mission (e.g.
These assumptions are then relaxed, and further examples defense of assets), enemy strength (number and effectiveness
demonstrate the ensuing complexity. of the enemy's weapons), defense strength (number and
effectiveness of the defense's weapons) and strategy and
tactics (preferential defense, shoot-look-shoot, etc.) It should
be noted that basic research studies on these topics are virtually
L INTRODUCTION non-existent.
Our long-range research objective is the quantitative study Our work is motivated by military defense problems, two
of the theory of distributed C3 organizations. Our present examples of which are as follows. The first example involves
research has been concentrated on certain aspects of situation the Anti-Aircraft Weapon (AAW) defense of the Naval battle
assessment and resource commitment. group or battle force platforms. The assets being defended are
aircraft carrier(s), escort warships and support ships each of
Situation assessment entails the use of sensors to detect which is of some intrinsic value to the defense. The threat to
and track the enemy and its weapons (i.e missiles, tanks etc.) these assets are enemy missiles launched from submarines,
These sensors are usually geographically distributed so that surface ships and aircraft. These missiles may have different
distributed algorithms are desirable. This problem can be damage probabilities which depend on the missile type, target
formulated as a distributed hypothesis testing problem. Results type, etc. The defense's weapons are different types of AAW
on this research can be found in the paper by Papastavrou and interceptors launched from Aegis and other AAW ships. The
Athans [1] in these proceedings. kill probability of these weapons may also depend on the
specific target-interceptor pair. The objective of the defense is
The resource commitment problem deals with the optimal to maximize the expected surviving value of the assets. The
assignment of the defense's resources against the offense's problem is to find which AAW interceptors should be assigned
forces so as to minimize the damage done to the defense's to each of the enemy missiles, when should they be launched
assets. If the battle is such that the defense has a single and why. This formulation allows for a preferential defense
opportunity to engage the enemy then the problem can be where, in a heavy attack, it may be optimal for the defense to
formulated as a static resource allocation problem. If multiple leave "low" valued assets undefended and concentrate its
engagements are possible (as for example in the Strategic resources on saving the "high" valued assets.
Defense System (SDS) scenario) then better use can be made
of the defense's resources by assigning them dynamically (i.e.
The second motivating example for our work is the Maximum Marginal Return algorithm, works by assigning the
midcourse phase of the Strategic Defense System. In this case weapons sequentially with each weapon being assigned to the
the assets are our (the defense's) Inter-Continental Ballistic target which results in the maximum marginal return in the
Missile (ICBM) silos, military installations, C3 nodes, objective function.
populations centers, etc. The threat to these assets are enemy
re-entry vehicles (RV's), surrounded by decoys. The In the special case in which the kill probability is the same
defense's weapons are Space-based kinetic-kill vehicles for all weapon-target pairs and all targets have the same value,
(SBKKV's) and ERIS interceptors. The objective of the the optimal assignment is obtained by dividing the weapons as
defense is the maximization of the expected surviving value of evenly as possible among the targets.
the assets. The problem is the determination of the optimal
weapon-target assignments and the timing of the interceptor
launches.launches. 3. THE DYNAMIC WTA PROBLEM
2. THE STATIC TARGET-BASED WTA PROBLEM The battle scenario for the dynamic problem is the same as
for the static problem except that the weapon assignments are
In this section we will present the static version of the done in time stages each of which consists of the following
target-based WTA problem. In this model, a number of steps:
missiles (the targets) are launched by the offense. The defense (a) Determine which targets have survived the last
has a number of interceptors (the weapons) with which to engagement,
destroy these missiles. The defense assigns a value to each of (b) Assign and fire a subset of the remaining weapons with
the targets based on factors such as target type, point of the objective of minimizing the total expected value of the
impact, etc. Associated with each weapon-target pair is a kill surviving targets at the end of the final stage.
probability which is the probability that the weapon will We have looked at some simple cases of this problem to gain
destroy the target if it is fired at it. We will make the insight into the general problem and to help bolster our
assumption that the action of a weapon on a target is intuition.
independent of all other weapons and targets. The problem
faced by the defense is the assignment of weapons to targets 3.1 The Two-Target Case
with the objective of minimizing the total expected surviving
target value. In this case we will assume that there are two targets(N=2), the kill probability is the same for all weapon-target
2.1 Mathematical Statement of the Static WTA Problem pairs, the defense has M weapons and there are K time
stages.With these assumptions we have proved the following
The following notation will be used: theorem:
N = the number of enemy targets
= the number of defense weaponrgets Theorem 3.1 Under the assumptions given above, an optimal
Vi = the number of defense weapons strategyfor the present stage can befound as follows. Let T =
Pij = probability that weaponj kills target i if shot at it rM/Ki. Solve the corresponding static problem with T
The solution will be represented by: weapons and denote the solution by {xi} where xi is the
optimal number of weapons to be assigned to target i. The
1 if weapon j is assigned to target i optimal assignment for the present stage of the dynamic
xiJ = o problem is to assign xi weapons to target i.0 otherwise
The optimization problem can now be stated as: If we further assume that Vi=l and that M is divisible by
N M 2K then it can be shown that the optimal target leakage J(K) is
mill J =XV 1 Jl,- p" (2.1) given by:min ' = .2 V(1 1- Pi)'(.
{xij~ {0,1} } i=1 j=M
J(K) = 2K(1 -p) -2(K- 1)(1 -p) . (3.1)
subject to: _xx =1 j1,. = 1,2 M Note that if K is large then the optimal leakage J(K) = 2(1-p)M
*u to J ij M ,_,,.-while the optimal leakage for the corresponding static problem
is 2(l-p)M/2. In other words, roughly half as many weapons
The objective function is the total expected value of the are required for the dynamic strategy to obtain the same
surviving targets while the constraint is due to the fact that expected leakage as that of the static strategy. This expresses,
each weapon can attack only one target. in a convenient form, the value of the battlespace to the
defense.
2.2 Comments on the Solution of the Static WTA Problem
In figure 1 we have plotted the ratio of the K-stage
This problem has been proven, by Lloyd and leakage to the static leakage versus the kill probability p for the
Witsenhausen [2], to be NP-Complete in general. This means case of two targets and 16 weapons. We have plotted the cases
that polynomial time algorithms for obtaining the optimal K = 2, 4 and 8. First note that the leakage advantage of the
solution do not exist. One must therefore resort to sub-optimal dynamic strategy over the static one increases with the kill
algorithms. probability. This is due to the fact that as the kill probability
increases, the information gained from the first stage
In the special case in which the kill probabilities are increases. This implies that more effective use will be made of
independent of the weapons, denBroeder et al. [3], have (costly) high accuracy weapons if the dynamic strategy is
proposed an optimal algorithm for the problem which runs in used. Next, note that the leakage advantage of the dynamic
polynomial time. This algorithm, which is usually called the strategy increases with the number of stages. This is due to the
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fact that the information gained increases with the number of 32 The TwoStage, N-Target Case
stages. Note, however, that most of the improvement is
obtained after only a small number of stages. In other words, In this section we will consider the two-stage dynamic
the curves rapidly converge as the number of stages increases.
This implies that, even if the number of stages is small, the singlem with N equally p (for all stages and w eapon-target
single kill probability p (for all stages and weapon-targetdynamic strategy offers a significant leakage advantage. pairs), and M weapons. Unlike the two target problem, we
were unable to find an analytical solution to this problem for
the case N>2. However, we were able to derive useful
K-stage leakage properties of the optimal solution. The first property, which
static leakage holds for the more general problem of K stages, is given as
theorem 3.2.
0.9 , Theorem 3.2 The optimal solution to the problem given
above has the property that the weapons to be used at each
0.8 stage are spread evenly among the surviving targets.
0.7 A - K-2 The above result simplifies the problem to be solved. Let
o e ' \0.8 ...K 8 us consider the two-stage problem. Let M2 denote the number
of weapons used in the first stage (i.e. 2 stages to go). The
0. e _ number of weapons that will be used in the last stage will then
be M-M 2. Denote the corresponding cost of the assignment, in
0.4 - which weapons are spread evenly at each stage, by J(M2). The
optimal solution can then be obtained by minimizing J(M2)
over the set {0,1 ...,M}.
o.2
If J(M2) happened to have a "convex" shape (i.e have the
0o. property that J(M2+1) - J(M2) 2 J(M2) - J(M2-1)) then the
above minimization could be done efficiently. Unfortunately,
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 I we can show (by example) that this is not the case.
kill probability p
Let us now consider the case of K stages, N equally
Figure 1: J(K)/J(1) vs. p for the case M=16 and N=2 valued targets, a single kill probability and M weapons with
the constraint that the number of weapons is less than the
number of targets. Our intuition tells us that a dynamic
Figure 2 contains plots of the ratio of the two-stage allocation should not perform any better than a static
leakage to the static leakage versus the kill probability p for the allocation. This is in fact the case. This result is given in the
case of two targets. We have plotted the cases for which M = following theorem.
4,8,12,16 and 20. Note that the leakage advantage of the
dynamic strategy increases with the number of weapons used. Theorem 3.3 Under the assumptions given above, a
Note also that the same leakage advantage can be obtained by dynamic allocation cannot perform any better than a static
either using a few high accuracy weapons or many low allocation. Hence it is optimal to assign all of the weapons in
accuracy weapons. thefirst stage.
The above theorem is not particularly enlightening but it
allows us to concentrate on the cases in which M>N. Let us
static leakage now consider the case in which there are two stages, N targets
each of unit value, a single kill probability p and M weapons
Ko8 . S by "I A\ with M > N. As before, let M2 denote the number of weapons
0 M-8 used in the first stage of a strategy.
. M-20 Theorem3.4 Under the assumptions given above, the
o-·~0.7 '- , optimal assignment has the property that M2 > N.
0o.·"\ Ad - a ,\ We conjecture that the above theorem can be extended to the
\', -"\case of more than two stages.
: 0 .6\
0.4 Using the properties given above we computed the
optimal solution to the two stage dynamic problem for various
o. numbers of weapons and targets using a kill probability of p =
0\.2 --- "' 0.9. The optimal values of M2 are given in table 1. The
0o.2 \ " number of targets varies from 1 to 10 (the columns) and the
number of weapons varies from 1 to 25.(the rows). In the
0.1 cases where the solution is non-unique we have chosen values
0ALE0 0.1 0:2 023 0:4 0 8 of M2 which exemplify any patterns. Note that for the cases N
o o.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0. 0. 0.7 0. 0.9 1 M < 2N-1 the optimal value of M2 is N. We conjecture that
kill probability p this result holds in general but have so far failed to find a
Figure 2: J(2)/J(1) vs. p for the case K=2 and N=2 proof.
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M N=I N.2 N=3 N=4 N-I N-6 N=7 N=81 N.9 N=10
, i I I 1 I 1 I iT 1F 1 2-stage leakage
2 1 2 2 21212 2 2 2 2
3 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 static leakage
4 1 2 3 4 4 41 4 4 4 t 1
5 1 2j3 4 s I 5 5 5 56' i 
3 [ 3 6 4151616I 16 6
7 4 4 1 3 4 i 5 6 1 7 7 7 7 
9 5 -T5 1 516 T 819 9 0.8
1 5 5 6 4 5 7 8 I 9 10
11 6 6 6 7 5 6 7 8 9 10
12 6 6 8 6 6 7 8 9 10 0.7I I~~~~~~~~~~.
13 7 I7 8 7 7 7 8 s 9 1I 
14 7 7 8 8 10 6 8 8 9 10 0.6
15 8 8 9 9 1 6 7 8 9 10
16 8 8 9 8 10 1 2 1 7 i 8 9 10 oN-2 ,N- 8-16 N
17 9 g 8 10 o 11 8 I 8 10 lo
18 9g g 9 12 10 12 1 14 8 I 9 10
19 10 10 11 12 3 10 12 i 13 10 9 10 0.4
20 10 10 12 12 I 10 12 14 8 9 10
21/ 11 11 12 12 11 1 2 14 I 10 o·
22 1n1 11 12 12 10 12 14 I 1 10 10 i 
23 12 12 13 13 11 12 14 16 11 11
24 12 12 14 12  14 12 1 4 16 18 12 0.2
2 13 1 13 15 15 15 13 1I 16 18 10
0.1
Table 1: Optimal values of M2 for N=l: 10, M=1:25, p--0. 9 o0
0 5 10 16 20 26
No. of defense weapons M
Figure 3 contains a plot of the ratio of the 2-stage leakage
to the static leakage versus the kill probability p with a 2:1 Figure 4: J(2)/J(1) vs. M for the case K=2 with p = 0.5
weapon to target ratio (i.e. M = 2N). We have plotted the
cases N = 2,4,6,8 and 10. Here we see that as the size of the
problem increases the leakage advantage of the dynamic model 4. DISTRIBUTION OF THE C3 FUNCTION
increases. This implies that, for the problems that concern us
(i.e. large scale problems), the dynamic model has a 4.1 Introduction
significant leakage advantage over the static model.
Although distribution of C3 functions is generally regarded
as desirable, little quantitative insight exists as to the resulting
2-stage leakage gains. Enhanced survivability of the BM/C 3 system is
static leakage typically cited as the reason for such distribution. Here we
,1~~~~~~~~ . ~~develop a concept of vulnerability for the WTA function and
consider its effect on allocation strategies. The underlying
o.9 paradigm is the defense asset model, in which the defense
defends a collection of differently valued assets against attack.
0.8
In such an engagement the objective of the offense is to
0.7 -- N-2 minimize expected surviving defense asset value. This can be
N'-~~~~~~ ' .... 6 accomplished by either attacking the assets themselves or by
0.6 - N-  first attacking the defense system, and then the assets.N-10
o0.6 C ~ ~ ~ \\: \\ ~~ ~Although various components of the defense system are
vulnerable we assume here that the objective is the command
0.4 and control centers, the destruction of which renders the
defensive stockpile unusable. A precursor attack increases the
0. . likelihood that the assets will be undefended and thus increases
their vulnerability, making this a potentially attractive offensive
o.2 strategy. Increased vulnerability, however, comes at the cost
of a reduction in the offensive stockpile available to attack
o.1 ~assets.
0 0.1 0.2 0 04 0.0. 0.7 0.8 . 1 The overall objective of the defense is to maximize0 0.2 0.3 0.4 O.B 0-6 0.7 0.8 O-g 
kill probability expected surviving asset value; BM/C 3 nodes exist and are
defended only insofar as they further this. Unless some
Figure 3 : J(2)/J(l) vs p for the case K=2 with M=2N redundancy is planned, a destroyed BM/C 3 node causes the
defensive weapons it controls to be useless. For the purposes
Figure 4 contains a plot of the ratio of the 2-stage leakage of initial analysis, we assume that command and control is
to the static leakage versus the number of weapons M with a centralized, and replication of function will occur at this level.
kill probability p = 0.5. We have plotted the cases N = 2,4,6,8 The defense has the potential to increase expected surviving
and 10. Note that the leakage advantage of the dynamic model value by allocating some portion of its stockpile to BM/C3
increases roughly exponentially with the number of weapons. defense, but in so doing reduces the number of weapons
This implies that the dynamic model is significantly better even available for defending assets.
for relatively small weapon to target ratios.
4.2 ProblemDefinition
The probability that all BM/C3 nodes are destroyed, using
We consider a set of Q defense assets each of value Vq to simplified probabilities, is
be defended, and a set of T identical BM/C3 nodes to do so. T at
Assets and C3 nodes are far enough apart so that a successful = 1 1 - 1 [l-p(l-r)Y']) (47)
attack on one does not affect any other. The defense can see ==l s=l
which assets or nodes are being engaged in time to intercept
the attack, if desired, but cannot adaptively change weapon
assignments based on damage assessment. where at and ys are offensive and defensive allocations for
the precursor attack, t indexes the C3 nodes and Pc is the
The defense has a stockpile of M interceptors and the offensive kill probability for C3 nodes. We assume that all
offense a stockpile of N missiles. Each side knows these
quantities. Interceptors are in a central stockpile, and are thus BM/C3 nodes must be destroyed to eliminate the defense.
capable of defending any C3 node or asset. Initially we The offense wants to minimize U, while the defense seeks
assume that all attacking missiles have the same probability of tomaximize it:
kill, p, and defending interceptors r. Thus the miss
probability for an unintercepted target (e.g. attacking missile) max min U
is (l-p), if intercepted by j defenders (l-p(l-r)i) and for i {(y,xi} fat,nq} (4.8)
such intercepted targets directed at the same asset (l-p(l-
r)i)i. Were kill probabilities dependent on weapons, targets A formal statement of the problem also includes constraints
and assets this would become (for a given asset q) reflecting stockpile size and shot integrality. The offense
Nq M allocation constraint
17[1-Pqi 1 J(1-rij)i ] (4.1)Ti=1"I j=a ,a+LNq =N (4.9)
t=l q=1
where xij = 1 if weapon j is assigned to target i and 0
otherwise, rij = kill probability for interceptorj fired at target requires that the sum of targets directed at C3 nodes and at
assets sum to the offensive stockpile. The defense allocationi, Pqi = kill probability for target i against asset q and Nq constraint
indexes the set of targets aimed at asset q. The simpler
version is T at
~~~N X~~y 8 + ~xYs + = M (4.10)JJ [l-p(1-r)x i'] (4.2) t=1 s=l q=l i=1(4.2)
i=l
similarly requires that defensive weapons sum to the
interceptor stockpile size.
where x i is the number of defensive weapons assigned to the
i-th target. The utility function, however, is nonlinear, nonconvex and
The objective function used is nonconcave. Minimal analytical insight has been developed,
and initially we discuss small numerical examples.
U = LV u + (1-~)V d (4 3)
4.3 Discussion
where , = probability that all C3 nodes are destroyed, Vu =
expected surviving asset value if undefended and Vd = The best way to demonstrate the complexity of strategiesfor such problems is to first consider simple cases. Assume
expected surviving asset value if defended. The offense, then, that the defense has the last move, and also that kill
seeks to minimize V and the defense to maximize it. In probabilities for targets against M/C 3 nodes p and
general, probabilities for targets against BM/C3 nodes (p) andgeneral, interceptors against targets (r) are unity; while targets against
A No M assets are less than one. Assets are taken to be of equal value
HV T(l-rJ..)J (4.4) and hence normalized to one. The offense, then, can either
Vd 1=.di1 -q1 1i attack just the assets, or first the BM/C3 nodes and then the
q7-1 i=1 j~1 assets. If the control nodes are attacked the defense will
defend just one by matching each incoming missile, obviously
With the above assumptions about kill probabilities, this choosing the most lightly attacked. As long as there are
reduces to interceptors left they will be so used in the first stage, for
N otherwise they are useless in the second. If there are any left
for the second stage, they will similarly be employed to
Vd = 2Vqfll[lp(l-r) 1 (4.5) successively defend the least attacked targets. Thus the
q=l i=l offense will attack all C3 nodes evenly, as it will also do for
assets (though not necessarily at the same level for both).
The expected number of surviving assets, if undefended, is Note that this is true only when C3 nodes are of equal value;
the same applies to the asset attacks. The purpose of a
V N. ~E~?·,cl-p~"·(4.6) precursor attack, with these kill probabilities, is to deplete the
Vu = ,! iVqGl p) q * defender's stockpile rather than to actually destroy the control
q=l nodes.
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In figure 6 (M=6), however, increasingly effectiveAn example from 114], with M=12, N=36, Q=12, p=l/3 interceptors prompts the offense to decrease its C3 attack(targets against assets), pc=r=-1 , vq=l for all q and 1 radar allocation from 4 to ; expected survivors have increase d
(rather than C3 node), shows that the offense minimizes significantly. This pattern continues in figure 7 for M=8,
expected surviving value by exhausting the defensive stockpile with the offense switching to an asset only attack at an even
in the first stage and then attacking the assets. [4] also give lower value of r. In figure 8, the offense will not attack the
expected surviving values for different strategies for the same BM/C3 system even for r=.7. We conclude that more and
parameters when there are 2 radars, and find that the optimal more effective defensive interceptors discourage attacks on the
offensive strategy is to ignore the C3 nodes and attack the BM/C3 system.
assets with the entire stockpile. But with the unity kill
probabilities used, it can be observed that the offense will
never choose a two stage attack (regardless of the value of p)
if there is more than one radar. Since the offense attacks
radars evenly, the defense receives a target-to-interceptor
exchange ratio equal to the number of radars, and this makes a
precursor attack undesirable.
When the assumption of unity kill probabilities is relaxed, .
strategies become much more complex. Interceptors might no 7
longer be singly matched to targets, and the destruction of C3
nodes loses its binary character. The offense and defense are
able only to modulate the probability that nodes and targets are
destroyed. The defense last-move case becomes a two-stage
allocation problem, with two different defensive objectives:
BM/C3 allocation strategies seek to maximize the probability of
at least one node surviving, while asset defense tries to
maximize the expected surviving value.
In [4]'s example the offense would not attack the BM/C 3
system if there were more than one node. Another example
shows that this no longer need hold when weapons are
imperfect. For the case of Q=4, N=12, p=.9 (both assets
and C3 nodes) and r ranging from .7 to 1.0, figures 5-8 show e
optimal strategies for M=4, 6, 8 and 10. Note that the
optimal strategies were obtained by an intelligent enumeration:
against candidate offensive strategies the defense employs that Figure 6: 9, P= 9,Q 4,N 12, M = 6
allocation which maximizes U; the offense then selects the
strategy corresponding to the minima of these maxima. Only
by simplifications regarding p, r and the vi is such an
enumeration feasible. In figure 5 (M=4) the offense allocates
4 of its 12 weapons to attack the C3 nodes when r is low, but
increases to 8 when r is high; this corresponds to defensive
allocations of at first 2 and then 3 interceptors in defense of the
C3 nodes. Not surprisingly, the number of expected survivors .L
is quite low.
J I .0 Figure 7: c = 9, Pa = 9, Q 4, N 12, M 8
QP[
Figure 5: Pc =.9, Pa =.9, Q =4, N = 12, M = 4
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o,) ." ' az f; 'as"g0
Figure 8: PC = .9, P = .9, Q =4,N= 12, M = 10
In figures 9-12 we present the results when the C3 nodes 'e°a
are softer targets than the assets: Pc = .95 and Pa (assets) =
.9; other parameters are Q=2, N=12 and r from .5 to .7.
When M=12 (figure 9) the offense attacks the C3 nodes with
6 weapons for all values of r. When the defensive stockpile Figure 10: P = .95, Pa= 9, Q=2, N 12,M 14
increases to 14, the C3 attack level drops to 4 only for r close
to 1.0 (figure 10). If increased to 16 or 18 (figures 11 and
12), however, the offensive C3 allocation drops to as low as 2
for high r, and then switches to 4 and then 6 as r drops. It
can be seen that softer C3 nodes encourage attack, even for
relatively large defensive stockpiles.
ar; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~r'E
=oe
Figure 9: PC = .95, Pa = .9, Q =2, N = 12, M = 12 
Figure 11: Pc = .95,Pa = .9, Q = 4 , N = 12,M=16
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Os
a4 .,..
Figure 12: PC = .95, Pa = 9, Q= 2, N= 12,M= 18 e
Figure 13 shows the gain that replication of the command
and control function provides. The ratio of the payoff for 2 C3
nodes to that of 1 C3 node is plotted against values of r that
range from .70 to 1.00 and for defensive stockpiles of 4, 8
and 12.
Payoff Ratio for Defense with 2 C3 Nodes: 1 C3 Node Figure 14: Pc=.9, P,=. 9, Q=4, N=12, M=12, 1 C3 Node
+11.0000
. .oM-4
+8.500 /
Offesive Stockpile 12
i-8
0 +3ZOOO !
+1.0000 ! A .
0.70 0.77 0.85 0.92 1.00 .
Defie MUlProility (r) .
Figure 13
For small M (4), the gain is quite marked: it climbs from 2
7 to over 10. The plateau occurs at the point at which the
offense switches from 2 to 4 and the defense from 2 to 3
weapons for the 2 C3 node case. When M=8 the gain at first
drops and then rises for increasing r, with the minima
occurring where strategies for the one C3 node case change.
Strategies remain the same for all values of r when M=12,
and the gain decreases monotonically - equalling one when r
equals one. This is to be expected, since when the defense has ..
12 perfect weapons, it doesn't matter whether there are 1 or 2 i .
C3 nodes: all of the offense's weapons will be successfully
intercepted. Figures 14 and 15 detail the strategies that lead to
this result, both one and two C3 nodes resulting in the same 6f. ° Defex
number of expected survivors when r=l, but with two C3
nodes being more effective for lower values of r.
Figure 15: Pc=.9, Pa=.9, Q=4, N=12, M=12, 2 C3 Nodes
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of feedback, i.e. optimal "shoot-look-
shoot-look-shoot-..." strategies, can significantly improve
defense effectiveness. Some extensions to the present model,
which we plan to consider, include stage-dependent target
values and kill probabilities, as well as consideration of the
dynamic version of the asset-defense problem. Unfortunately,
this will mean dealing with substantially increased complexity.
In completing the study of the impact of vulnerable C3
nodes, a limited domain of control for each node will be
introduced. This begins to consider the effect that a distributed
organizational structure has on the implementation of WTA
strategies, and raises such questions as how many BM/C3
nodes and of what type there should be. The issue of differing
values for both C3 nodes and assets must be addressed, since
valuation will better enable us to quantify performance, and
evaluate the tradeoffs that occur as distribution increases.
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